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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
~IARION

W. MALMSTROM,
Plain tiff and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

10110

THERON c. OLSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
B~\SIS

FOR PETITION FOR RE·HEARING

The respondent, Theron C. Olsen, respectfully
~ubmits the decision of the Court rendered herein
on :\larch 19, 1965 reversing the trial court's nonsuit judgment in favor of the respon·dent does not
apply the proper legal stJan·dard in determining
\vhether appellant ·had produced sufficient evidence
to allo\v the jury to determine the respon·dent's alleged malpractice, and that this Court should grant
respondent's petition for rehearing and consider its
pre,·ious decision.
1
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CO'U RT DID NOT AP.P LY A PROPER STANDARD IN DETERMINING WHE'T HER THE APPELLANT H.A:D PRESENTE'D SUFFJCTENT EVIDENCE
FROM WHICH A JURY ·C·OULD CON'C.L UDE T'HE RESPONDENT WAS GUILTY OF MAUPRACTICE.

It is respe~tfully submitted th~at the evidence
offered at the trial of the instant case will not support a judgment of malpractice based upon a theory
that 'the actions of the respondent and the claimed
resulting injury were such that a jury could reasonably conclude the respondent !h ad departed from
\accepted treatment standards for ·chiropractors.
'The fact ·as presented in the trial ·court showed
that the appellant went to respondent, a chiropractor, because of previotls back pain. She sought treatment for her back although she had not previously
experienced difficulty with her neck. She received
a treatment, including the manipulation of 'her neck,
which tre'a tment including the neck treatment was
similar to what she had experienced in the past
(R-1'13, 114). The only eh·ange was that she experienced a pain in her neck. She did not become ill, vomit, or faint. That the treatment given at that time
by the respondent was n·dt so obviously 'improper,
appears from the fact that the appellant returned
the next day for further treatment (R-48). She
'then experienced somewhat the same treatment as
the day before. Again there was no immediate impairment or onset of pain. Supporting the conclu1

1

1
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~ion

that appellant, a nurse, did not conclude that
anything extraordinary had occurred as a result of
the trPan1ent is the fact th·at thereafter she went
on a vacation for nine days, and experienced no
additional discomfort, ·but rather the pain subsided
(R-92).
1\t no tilne did the appellant, who is the only

one ousicle of the respondent most likely to know
ho\v n1uch force was used in manipulating her neck,
testify that the respondent "violently" jer'ked her
neck. She silnply said the treatment involved rough
jerks ( R-47, 49).
The Court apparently feels that this evidence
flagrantly demonstrates 1a failure to use proper
chiropractic standards 'that a layman can conclude
the conduct of respondent was m'alpractice. In suppol't of the majority conclusion, the Court relies on
ll"alkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654
(1937) <.:tnd Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385,
227 P.2d 772 ( 1951). It is apparent from a re'ading
of these cases that they do not involve facts similar
to those in the instant ·case, nor provide any basis
for a conclusion that the fa~ts in this case justify
a decision of 1nalpracti'ce merely because of the alleged results. In Walkenho1·~t, the defendant, a
chiropractor, stepped outside his field and sought
to diagnose a disease. He failed to recognize an
obYious infection and inflam1ation of the ;hip which
'vould be recognizable as something more th·an rheun1atisn1. Such facts are In no way comparable to
the instant case.
3
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In the Fredrickson ease, a surgeon left materials
in a wound. This is a recognized and obvious exception to the general rule requiring expert testimony of malpractice. McCoid, Lwbility of Medical
Pr:actitioners, Professional Negligence, p. 74 ( 1960).
The facts in Fredrickson support no conclusion of
negligence in this instant case. Consequently, the
precedent directly relied on by the m1ajority of the
Court affords no legal basis for the conclusion
reached.
1

The majority cites the case of Farrah v. Pattou,
99 Colo. 41, 59 P.'2d 76 (1986) as being "very
similar" to the instant ·case. Again, reading of that
case shows th·at i't is in opposite to the facts here
presented. In F~arr~ah, the plaintiff experienced a
'~terrific jerk" or "yank" on the neck followed by
the immediate onset of intense pain, paralysis and
vomiting. Further, the defendant himself acknowledged 'he had been a ''little rough''. This case is obviously not "very similar" to the instant case and,
in fact, is obviously greatly different ~and more
aggravated in action an·d symptom. Further, 'the
Court fails to note a subsequent Colorado case where
the facts were almost identical with those in the
instant case. In Klimkiewicz v. Karnick, 372 P.2d
736 (Colo., 1962), the Colorado Su~preme Court reversed a judgment for plain'tiff under the facts of
the instant cas.e because the ;trial court h!ad instructed the jury in a manner that would have allowed ~a finding of negligence without a 'finding of
4
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son1e departure from recognized chiropractic treatment. In its opinion, the Court stated the facts and
noted that the standard of care for the profession
mu~t be proved. It stated:
1

''The plaintiff does not claim improper diagnosis; she expressly admits that the technique
tha t defendant alleges he used as proper chiroprt~tic treatment and that the method which
demonstrated as th·at used was proper. Thus
we find that plaintiff's complaint is confined
to the fact th·at defendant gave her arm a
'tremendous yank'. This was part of the !admitted 'proper chiropractic treatment'. In giving this 'tremendous yank' as related by plaintiff, or in applying '·a mild firm extension
. . . to the arm', ·as related by defendant no matter which version is correct- ·fue ·defendant's actions were those of a doctor under
contractural obligations, and the propriety of
the s·ame must be measured ·by the rules governing one in his position.''
1

1

No proof of the standard of care for the chiropractic profession was offered in the instant case.
The Court h as simply allowed the result to
sustain a finding of negligence without showin·g a
departure from procedure or ~hat 'the result could
not have occurred with proper procedure. 'This is
rontraray to all medical jurisprudence under similar facts. A practitioner does not warrant his results; it must be shown by substantial evidence not
"conjecture or speculation". Anderson v. Nixon,, 104
Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216 (1943). Chiropracti'cs by
1
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definition involves the palpation and manipulation
of the body, Kalkenhorst v. Kesler, supra, which is
the treatment respondent performed. Nor does the
fact that a ruptured disc resul ted demonstrate the
'abandonment of proper technique since a ruptured
disc may result from trivial impact or actions associated wifu less than accepted pressure tolerance.
Gelfand-M·agana, Courtroom Medicine-The Low
B~ack, §§ 11.42-44; Ballard & Ballard v. Pelaia, 73
So.'2d 840 (Fla., 1954) , where the Florida Court
stated:
" ... It is common medical knowledge that a
ruptured dise frequently arises from an apparently trivial injury.''
Indeed such factors as previous back trouble,
pre-disposition, age, degeneration, skeletal problems are factors that may effect an action resulting
in a ruptured di~sc. ·These factors, the correct treatment to be used under the circumstances and the
question of whether the results and circums'tances
show negligence obviously are areas where judgment, eX!perience, medical conditioning ·and training
are involved and thus an area requiring expert testimony not lay supposition.
1

It is difficult to see how the majority can distinguis1h the legal basis of the case of Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (195'9) from
the instant case. There, this Court required expert
testimony to prove negligence from a cast which was
too tight. A tight cast involves the question of pres6
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~urc,

the use of judgment and medical technique.
Palpation and manipulation of the spine also concern the same elements thus necessitating expert
tt)stimony on the isstle of negligence.
The only conclusion that follows is that in case
against tnedical doctors, the legal standard of proof
of negligence is different from th·at of a chiropractor, a conclusion which is legally unsound. Such a
result defeats logic and obviously could not h ave
been intended. This Court should on re'hearing adopt
the minority position and affirm the trial court.
1

CON·CLUSION
It seems inescapable that the m·ajori'ty of the
Court have confused ~he concept of proof of negligence with proof of proximate cause and thus greatly expanded the exception to the geneiia:l rule that
1nalpractice n1ust be shown ·by expert testimony. In
doing so, the Court is making a legislative judgment
based on a policy of holding chiropractors responsible
for their results without ·any re·al proof of negligence except from the results, which is a tautological result. It is submitted the majority of the
Court has erred and reh~aring ·should be granted.
Respectfully submrtted,
HANSON & BALDWIN
Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
Ther011 C. Olsen
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